Mapping public support for further European unification: a multilevel analysis by Jacquier, Kristel
Mapping public support for further European
unification: a multilevel analysis
Kristel Jacquier
To cite this version:
Kristel Jacquier. Mapping public support for further European unification: a multilevel anal-
ysis. Documents de travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2016.31 - ISSN: 1955-611X.
2016. <halshs-01316913>
HAL Id: halshs-01316913
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01316913
Submitted on 17 May 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
Documents de Travail du 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mapping public support for further European 
unification: a multilevel analysis 
 
Kristel JACQUIER 
 
2016.31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13 
http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/ 
ISSN : 1955-611X 
 
Mapping public support for further European 
unification: a multilevel analysis 
Kristel JACQUIER1 
Abstract: 
Using individual-level data from the European Social Survey, a multilevel analysis involving 21 
countries was conducted to identify contextual preference formation. We show that individual 
predictors such as education work differently in different institutional contexts. Contrary to previous 
finding in the literature we find that the higher the percentage of tertiary education, the smaller the 
education gap in public support for the EU.   
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Most empirical studies on public support focus on membership support
2
. We argue that levels of 
membership support alone do not give an accurate picture of where public opinion stands on the EU. 
This chapter proposes to document support for further European integration
3
. In the context of 
economic crisis in the EU, some individuals might consider unification of Europe as a positive step but 
are dissatisfied with the European agenda. To do so, we use a survey question from the European 
Social Survey (ESS) asking European citizens whether or not European unification should go further 
using a 0 to 10 scale.  
 
The contribution to the literature is threefold. First a new dataset is exploited; the question of further 
unification is essential and is not covered by the Eurobarometer survey question traditionally used in 
the literature. Secondly, the paper contributes to the debate on territorial VS transnational cleavage. 
Finally, very few empirical studies include a regional dimension to its analysis of public support for the 
European Union. 
 
A multilevel analysis involving 21 countries was conducted to identify contextual preference formation. 
Variance components analysis reveals that a multilevel structure is sound although the variance at the 
region and country levels is negligible compared to the individual level. Individual level predictors 
confirm that wide divides among social groups exist regarding the EU. Focusing on further integration 
rather than EU membership support does not lead to a different conclusion in this respect. Highly 
skilled occupations and high incomes support further European integration a lot more than any other 
groups. Using random slope we see that individual factors such as education vary from one region to 
another or one country to another. In the next sections, explanatory variables are included at both 
levels to see if country and region divides can be explained
4
. Several predictors stand out: the 
percentage of tertiary education, the GDP and the percentage of net migration for regions, corruption, 
young unemployment and social expenditures for countries. As a final step, cross-level interactions are 
estimated. We find that wage coordination enhances the positive impact of education. Conversely the 
higher the percentage of tertiary education, the smaller the education gap in public support for the EU.   
                                                     
2
 The survey question usually used in the literature is found in the Eurobarometer (surveys carried by the European 
Union): Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership in the European Community (Common 
Market) is a bad thing (1), neither good nor bad (2), or a good thing (3)? 
3
 In the present text, the terms "integration" and "unification" shall be used indiscriminately. They are regarded as 
similar concepts.  
4
 The variables are obtained from multilevel data ESS6, eurostat and Visser (2015) 
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 LITERATURE 
 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) describe two types of political cleavage: National/territorial and 
transnational/socioeconomic. National cleavages result from the historical, cultural and economic 
context people live in. Socioeconomic cleavages correspond to social classes (income and education 
levels mainly) as well as differences based on values (post materialism and cognitive mobilization). The 
present chapter investigates the economic determinants of public support for European Union and the 
interaction between national and transnational drivers.  
We rely on utilitarian explanations to account for socioeconomic cleavages. This utilitarian theory is 
based on the assumption that individuals calculate their expected gains from European integration, 
and the likelihood of positive evaluations is positively related to one's relative human capital (Gabel, 
1998b). Gabel and Palmer (1995) and Anderson and Reichert (1995) provide evidence supporting the 
utilitarian model. They showed that the higher the income, the higher the support for EU membership. 
Kaltenthaler et al (2004) demonstrate that the most educated have the necessary skills to maximize 
their earnings in the global economy. Citizens with higher levels of education tend to be greater 
supporters of pro-market policies because they identify themselves as potential winners of market 
competition.  
As for national cleavages, the study will focus on the economic context. We assume that the EU tends 
to be evaluated according to the potential added value it might bring to the national situation. Several 
studies indicate that citizens evaluate the EU based on macroeconomic performances (Eichenberg and 
Dalton, 1993; Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Gabel and Palmer, 1995). Indeed, the founders of the EU 
justified the integration in terms of welfare gains from trade. Nevertheless, the explanatory power of 
macro-economic predictors has largely decreased over time (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). Using 
Eurobarometer data, they emphasize that the higher the social expenses, the less citizens support EU 
action on health and social security (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007:143 and 150). They make the case 
that many citizens want to preserve their national arrangements, notably social protection. Labor 
market or social protection policies are at the very root of socio-political compromises that funded 
post-war European economies. Eichenberg and Dalton also stress the influence of the EMU and its 
budgetary implications. Indeed, while European policies constrain national governments, there are no 
welfare state policies at the EU level. Citizens in the largest welfare states are likely to fear a decrease in 
social spendings as a consequence of European integration (Marks and Steenbergen, 2004). Kvist and 
Saari, (2007) investigate precisely this constraining effect of European integration on national welfare 
states (notably through the EMU). 
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.31
Brinegar and Jolly (2005) make a bridge between national and transnational determinants. They intend 
to comprehend how national specificities (such as political-economic institutions and factor 
endowment) can reinforce or mitigate the impact of socioeconomic determinants on EU support
5
. 
Using Eurobarometer data, the skill level is taken into account through the frame of national factor 
endowments (skilled endowment is measured as the percentage of the population completing 
secondary education) and varieties of capitalism. They predict that in countries relatively well endowed 
with low-skilled workers, low-skilled workers should support integration, and the opposite would be 
true in countries with a scarcity of low-skilled labor. Additionally, workers in the most generous welfare 
states are more likely to perceive integration with a 'race-to-the-bottom' and be less supportive of the 
EU (Brinegar and Jolly, 2005). They find that skill-based differences are not uniform across countries.  
In the present study we also investigate how contextual factors mediate the influence of transnational 
variables that shape individual attitudes towards the EU such as occupational status. We further 
document the role of national determinants and extend it to test if regions are a relevant level of 
analysis to understand differences in public support for the EU. There are sound reasons to believe that 
regional contexts influence public support for the EU. First of all, the geographical location might affect 
the perception of citizens, for example in cross-border regions. EU support is expected to be stronger 
in regions hosting EU institutions such as Alsace, the Brussels-Capital region, Luxembourg and Hesse. 
On the other hand, according to their economic specific characteristics, regions are more or less 
affected by the EU. Its impact might appear damaging in certain regions. For example EU member-
states are responsible for huge transit traffic in Tyrol which is viewed negatively by the Tyrolean people 
due to the pollution and noise caused by this transit traffic
6
. Some EU policies are controversial, 
opposition to the CAP and the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is found in the most rural regions, 
hostility to the CFP is also present in some coastal regions (Landes). Strong dissatisfaction with the 
EU's reform of the wine sector was expressed in the region of Aquitaine. These differences exist and 
the literature has highlighted some of them. Perrineau (2005) showed differences of up to 30 
percentage points between regions in terms of no votes in France in the 2005 referendum on the EU 
constitutional treaty. Kaiser (1995) analyzed the 1994 accession referenda in the Nordic countries and 
finds that inter-regional differences in levels of support reached a 20 percentage point difference. 
Trouvé (2005) found that French citizens voted markedly against the EU Constitutional Treaty in 
Aquitaine. Lubbers and Scheepers (2010) build a four-level model to emphasize how trends in political 
euroscepticism
7
 vary both at the national and the regional levels. They find deviance from the country-
level trend in four regions. In Greece, dytiki Macedonia shows a weaker decrease in Euroscepticism 
                                                     
5
 The authors constructed a new dependent variables labeled Overall European Integration View (OEIV) combining 
several dimensions of EU perceptions 
6
 No stops are necessary to transit freight through the Alps so the positive economic effects for the local alpine 
population is almost zero 
7
 Political euroscepticism refers to citizens who reject the EU because they fear a loss of national sovereignty   
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compared to the rest of Greece and the opposite is observed in Thessalia. The north of Luxembourg 
has become more eurosceptical over time than the rest of the country. Finally, the decrease in 
Euroscepticism is more pronounced in Castilla-La-Mancha than in Spain as a whole.  Although Lubbers 
and Scheepers consider the variance at the regional level, they did not include any variable at the 
regional level that would help explain those differences. 
 
Our study conveys another important contribution to the literature. Most empirical studies on public 
support use membership support as a proxy for European integration. We argue that support for 
membership is not enough to grasp preferences towards the EU. The issue of further integration is 
critical, especially in the context of economic crisis in the area. Hobolt (2014) investigate the support 
for deepening, or widening the European Union (further enlargement). The empirical analysis relies on 
Eurobarometer survey data over the period 2005-2012. Support for deepening is defined as 
strengthening the EU authority and is measured through support for integration in common foreign 
and security policy (CFSP) and support for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The focus is on 
citizens who support deepening but not widening. Hobolt finds that citizens in core Eurozone 
countries, in net contributor states and in countries experiencing growth are more likely to support 
further integration, but not enlargement. High skilled workers also support deepening without 
widening. Their findings are consistent with the utilitarian theory: winners of the integration process 
want to deepen and reinforce the Union but they do not want to include new member states. Net 
contributor countries are especially concerned with the additional financial burden poorer member 
states might bring. These results suggest that economic variables are good predictors of support for 
further unification. Contrary to what is presented in Hobolt (2014), some individuals might consider 
unification of Europe as a positive step but are dissatisfied with the course of negative integration
8
 
(Scharpf, 1999). In countries where citizens strongly support membership, a significant number might 
be unsatisfied with the political agenda of the EU (attitude that would be referred as soft-
euroscepticism here) and as a consequence oppose further integration. This is the case in Belgium 
(Abts et al, 2009). We assume that support for further unification also reflects support for the current 
political agenda of the Union. Consequently it is reasonable to think that among traditional supporters 
of the EU, some might find further unification undesirable.  
 
 
                                                     
8
 Deregulation of national norms rather than new institutions or programs 
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THE DATA 
 
The analysis is based on the European Social Survey (ESS) dataset. The program was launched by the 
European Science Foundation (ESF) and designed to compare social attitudes and values across 
European countries. The ESS provides a large data sample (at least 1,500 respondents per country) and 
employs the most rigorous methodologies. Kohler (2007) describes the ESS as the most reliable data 
for international comparisons. The analysis includes 21 EU member states: Germany, Belgium, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Cyprus. The 
appendix provides descriptive statistics of the main national trends. We use the most recent wave 
including multilevel data: ESS6. The individual level data from ESS6 were collected in 2012. Multilevel 
data are provided to document the context the ESS-respondents live in. Three levels are considered: 
individuals (the respondents), regions
9
 and countries
10
. Data at the regional and national levels are 
from 2011. We assume that individuals base their preferences on past macroeconomic information. 
The variables from ESS included in the analysis at the region-level are the percentage of tertiary 
education, the regional GDP, young unemployment, long-term unemployment and the percentage of 
net migration by region. Variables at the country-level are also sourced from the ESS: Social 
expenditure in percentage of GDP 2011, Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income 2011, 
Unemployment rates by age 15-24 years in % 2011 and percentage of tertiary education.  We use the 
following survey question: 
 “Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. 
 Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best 
 describes your position? “ 
 
There are two other sources of data. Eurostat provided two variables (GDP and GDP per capita in 
Purchasing Power Standards (PPS)). We also use two variables from the Database on Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts provided by Jelle 
Visser: Union density and coordination of wage-setting. See the appendix for details on the variables 
and their sources.  
 
 
                                                     
9
 The regional variables are downloaded every second year. The variables from ESS 6 were downloaded in 2014 
10
 The selection of variables provided by the ESS is based on the recommendations in the report of the ESS 
Upgrade and Planning Group on Contextual Data: 'Conceptual and Statistical Issues in Multilevel Analysis' 
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MULTILEVEL MODELING 
 
Ignoring the multilevel data structure carries possibly incorrect standard errors and inflated Type 1 
error rates (the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis although it is true). If the context is ignored, 
the individuals (N) are considered as independent. However, if individual-level factors are influenced 
by contextual factors then individuals sampled from the same context are not independent, but 
clustered. When those effects are not controlled for, the assumption that the errors are independent is 
violated. Including dummy variables for each subgroup captures the unique variation among the 
subgroups and standard errors are corrected. However, dummy variables do not explain why the 
different subgroups vary. Including subgroup level predictors and interacting subgroups characteristics 
with predictors measured at a lower level of analysis provide information on the behavior of each 
subgroup. On the other hand, interactive models assume that the subgroup level predictors fully 
account for subgroup differences
11
. This is a very strong assumption which is usually not confirmed by 
the data. Multilevel modeling, as presented in this paper, exploits the theoretical opportunity to 
explain why subgroups differ and meet the statistical challenge that clustered data presents 
(Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). We rely on a multilevel model to account for variance in a dependent 
variable measured at the individual level (support for further unification in the EU) using information 
from three levels of analysis: individuals, regions and countries. Variance components analysis is run 
using mixed-effects restricted maximum likelihood (REML) regression. Maximum likelihood parameters 
are those parameters estimates that maximize the probability of finding the sample data that was 
actually found. 
 
The variance analysis enables to decompose the variance in EU support: 
         (1) 
 
Equation (1) is the individual level model.  is individual-level variation around this mean.  is the 
mean level of EU support in region  in country : 
 
is the overall mean of EU support (the mean across individuals, regions and countries) and  is 
cross-national variation around the mean. The national mean for EU support can be written as 
. Finally,  is the region-level variation around this mean.  
 
                                                     
11
 A random error is only incorporated at the lowest level and error components are assumed to be zero at the 
highest levels of analysis 
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The variances components are given by  (cross-national variation),  (regional variation) and 
(overall variation). If there is no variance at the regional and country levels, then responses from any 
EU countries and regions are expected to vary from the EU mean respondent in the same way. If there 
is cross-country and cross-region variance, individuals in different countries and regions will vary 
together from the EU mean respondent.  
 
As a second step we estimate a linear model and include explanatory variables at the individual level 
(equation (2)). Although they most certainly play a role, no historical or cultural variables are included 
in the model; the focus is exclusively on economic factors.  is a vector of individual socio-
demographic characteristics (age and gender), and the socioeconomic position of individuals (ISCO 
classification, employment status and employment relation). 
 
          (2) 
 
By modeling , regional level predictors can be included: 
         (3) 
 
Thirdly, country-level drivers are included in the regional-level constant, : 
         (4) 
 
R and C stand for predictors at the regional and country level respectively.  
If we make the assumption that the effect of regional predictors is fixed (we write ) and the 
effect of the individual-level predictor is fixed as well (  then substituting (3) and (4) into 
equation (2) yields: 
                                    (5) 
 
 
 
For both technical and theoretical however, the full model (including both regional and national 
predictors) presented in equation (5) is never implemented. Instead the predictors at the country and 
regional levels are included separately:  
     (Model 1.1) 
    (Model 2) 
    (Model 3.1) 
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 So far, we have made the assumption that the individual-level predictors have fixed effects. Only the 
intercept was allowed to vary across levels (see figure 1). However, our theoretical framework implies 
that individual variables have a different impact on public support according to the characteristics of 
the region and the country respondents live in. To model causal heterogeneity
12
, we drop the 
assumption of fixed effects for education:  
   
 (Model 1.2) 
With , a vector for each explanatory variable at the individual level except education  
and   
 
Lastly, a model involving interaction terms between the individual level and the national level is 
estimated:  
  (Model 3.2) 
 
 is a vector for each explanatory variable not interacted with country-level variables.  
 is a vector for individual level variables interacted with the country level variables.  
 
 
                                                     
12
 Following Western (1998), assuming that individual variables have a different impact according to the context 
people live in is referred to as "causal heterogeneity" by Steenbergen and Jones (2002) 
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VARIANCE COMPONENTS ANALYSIS  
 
Table 1 
Parameter Estimates 
Fixed Effects 
 Constant 5.114 
 
(0.149) 
  Variance Components 
 Country-level ( ) 0.437 
 
(0.145) 
Region-level ( ) 0.215 
 
(0.028) 
Individual-level ( ) 6.575 
 
(0.048) 
  -2 x Log Likelihood 176514,86 
    
***=p >0.01 
N= 37161 
 
The intercept-only model (or variance component analysis) is estimated using mixed-effects restricted 
maximum likelihood (REML) regression on our large sample. Table 1 displays the REML estimates of 
the grand mean and the variance components. The intercept is 5.114 which is the average answer 
across all countries, regions and individuals.  
As previously found in the literature (Brinegar and Jolly, 2005; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002) the 
variance component at the individual level explains the largest part of the variance in EU support. The 
intra-cluster correlations (ICC) are equal to the proportion of the total variance that the variance 
components at each levels account for
13
. Individual level variation accounts for 91% of total variation 
here, countries and regions for 6% and 3% respectively.  
 
In the literature section, we have detailed the main reason why regions matter and we have seen that 
regional disparities in public support for the EU are wide. Regional-level residuals ( ) and their 
standard errors were calculated. Figure 1 illustrates that marked differences between regions are 
present in our data.  
 
 
                                                     
13
 The ICC formula is:  at the individual level,  at the region-level, and  at the country-
level  
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Figure 1 
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Table 2 presents the ranking of residuals among the 21 countries included in the present study. The 
United Kingdom has an estimated residual of -1.146. We estimate a mean score of 5.114-1.146=3.968. 
In contrast, the mean score for Bulgaria is estimated as 5.114+1.34= 6.454.  Those results illustrate that 
cross-country variation in public support for further integration is wide among the countries included 
in our sample. It is worth noticing that among the least supportive of further integration we now find 
structurally eurosceptical countries (The UK, Finland, Estonia and Sweden) but also countries that used 
to be strongly supportive of the EU and suffered from the debt crisis and austerity programs imposed 
by EU authorities: Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus.  
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Table 2  
Country residuals  
United Kingdom -1,146142 
Finland -0,8440557 
Ireland -0,621327 
Estonia -0,6098456 
Portugal -0,5701677 
Sweden -0,4202052 
Czech republic -0,3752307 
Cyprus -0,3005999 
Slovakia -0,276798 
Hungary -0,2556635 
France -0,1190227 
Netherlands -0,0092815 
Belgium 0,1903609 
Slovenia 0,2178813 
Germany 0,3350276 
Poland 0,5798509 
Lithuania 0,5844846 
Denmark 0,5995718 
Italy 0,7949169 
Spain 0,9059339 
Bulgaria 1,340312 
 
The fact that cross-country differences are significant is already acknowledged in the literature. Our 
aim is to test the main results in the literature on a different sample (including new member states and 
at a more recent period) and include new variables at the country-level to extend the state of 
knowledge in the field.   
 
Standard likelihood ratio (LR) test procedures are applied to determine the significance of variance 
components
14
. Two models are compared. Model 1 (m1) is a null single level model. Model 2 (m2) is 
null but includes 3 levels: individuals, regions and countries.  
 
Large sample Reduced sample
m2-m1: LR = 2471.426 m2-m1: LR= 929.29147
Prob > chi2 = 0 Prob > chi2 = 1.61e-202  
 
In both cases the multilevel model fits better the data.  
 
                                                     
14 we consider the large sample including 21 countries 
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EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND MAIN HYPOTHESIS 
 
Socioeconomic determinants include income, occupation, trade union membership and the 
employment status.  
Gabel and Palmer (1995) make the hypothesis that high income citizens are most capable to grasp the 
opportunities associated with capital market liberalization (investment opportunities and low inflation) 
and find empirical evidence supporting this assumption. Thus citizens belonging to high income 
families are expected to be more supportive of the EU than lower incomes. Gabel (2009) assumes that 
labor market liberalization benefits high-skilled workers because they are in a better position to 
compete on an international labor market. High-skilled positions such as managers and professionals 
are expected to be the most supportive occupational categories and low-skilled occupations (plant 
and machin operators, and elementary workers) to be more eurosceptical. Along with mainstream 
political parties, most European trade unions had adopted a pro-European position. However, the 
prospect of a “social Europe” has been challenged by the completion of the internal market, the 
enlargements and EU legislation such as the Posted Worker Directive (1996)
15
 (Leconte, 2010). Thus the 
impact of trade union membership is not clear and might depend on union density. We do not have 
strong assumptions for every employment status, except for students. The fact that students are the 
most supportive of European integration is widely acknowledged. Students are expected to strongly 
support further integration. Unemployed people might also have distinct preferences from paid 
worker
16
. Iversen and Soskice (2001) assume that unemployed people need social transfers and are 
consequently opposed to policies that might weaken the welfare state. If the process of European 
integration is seen as encouraging liberalization, then unemployed Europeans would tend to oppose 
European integration. However, if the EU is able to pursue socioeconomic policies that could help 
them maximize their chances of finding a job, outsiders such as the unemployed might support the EU 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999).  
Overall, our hypothesis regarding socioeconomic determinants is that the economic policies 
implemented by the European Union (notably budgetary orthodoxy or liberalization policies) are 
unlikely to favor low income, low-skilled or people dependent on state generosity.  
 
We test four predictions found in the literature about the national context. Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) 
showed that levels of national support for integration are higher in countries that suffer greater 
corruption. The author argues that the worse the opinion of the national political system, the lower the 
                                                     
15 The directive states that firms seconding workers in another member state have to abide by the host country’s conditions in 
terms of the minimum legal wage and working time limits. It led to several controversial decisions from the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ). Trade Unions accused the ECJ of prioritizing market integration over workers’ rights.  
16 In chapter two we saw that unemployed people trusted the EU significantly less   
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opportunity cost of transferring sovereignty to Europe. Thus we expect corruption to increase support 
for the EU.  Kuhn et al (2014) show that growing inequalities are correlated with more euroscepticism 
especially among the low educated. The present study involves cross-sectional data which means that 
only the level of income inequality is considered. However, we expect the income inequality to 
decrease support, especially among the low educated. The study from Brinegar and Jolly (2005), 
presents two main hypothesis. They assume that the impact of education on public support for the EU 
will differ according to the skill endowments in the country and the welfare state type
17
. They predict 
that in countries relatively well endowed with low-skilled workers, low-skilled workers should support 
integration, and the opposite would be true in countries with a scarcity of low-skilled labor. 
Additionally, they expect workers in the most generous welfare states to be less supportive of the EU. 
These hypotheses will be tested with our data. Social expenses are used as a proxy for welfare state 
type. We expect respondents with large social expenses to fear a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ between EU 
countries. Scheve (2000) proposed an interesting theory about the role of wage bargaining. He argues 
that centralized wage bargaining tends to reduce wage inequality, thus the distributive consequences 
of integration are mitigated and individuals are less threatened by European integration. The evidence 
presented in the paper by Scheve implies that the well known skill cleavage in opinion formation over 
European integration should be attenuated by a high degree of wage bargaining centralization. This 
hypothesis will be tested on a different sample
18
.  
We also test for the impact of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards, young unemployment, 
and union density because we expect them to be relevant in the present context . The expected sign is 
positive for GDP, and negative for young unemployment. In the context of economic crisis in the EU 
and a lack of solidarity in the euro zone, we expect poor economic performances to erode confidence 
in the European Union
19
. Union density is a proxy for the prevalence of trade unions. If unions are 
strong, they are expected to inform workers about the consequences of further European integration, 
should it be the opportunities or the risks. In the context of the debt crisis, it is reasonable to expect 
union density to decrease support for further integration. However, the impact of trade unions might 
be limited to trade union members.  
 
Additionally, structural factors are included in order to document the socio-economic profiles of a 
given region and proxy the perceived benefits and costs associated with European integration. We 
include the percentage of tertiary education, regional GPD and unemployment (long term 
unemployment and young unemployment). We make the same assumption we made at the country 
                                                     
17
 The variable for welfare state type is coded as a continuous value which takes the value 1 for social democratic, 
2 for Christian democratic and 3 for residual welfare states.  
18
 The sample in Scheve (2000) includes Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Finland, Sweden and Austria.  
19
 This result was already found in the previous chapter 
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level. We also include the percentage of net migration and make the assumption that more 
cosmopolitan regions would be more supportive of further European integration. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL PREDICTORS  
 
Fixed effects 
First, individual level variables are included in the regression. Although the sample is reduced
20
 
compared to table 1 and thus the variance residual cannot be compared directly, one can see that the 
individual-level predictors explain very little of the individual level variance in EU support. Hooghe and 
Marks (2005) argue that identity explains a larger part of the variance than economic factors. However, 
taking into account identity consists in including survey questions that reflect the respondent's 
opinion
21
, to explain public support for the EU which is also an opinion. Our focus on economic 
variables is an attempt to draw a causal relationship between the objective information available 
concerning the respondents (age, nationality, gender, income, and occupational status) and preference 
formation towards the EU. We are aware that including variables such as EU attachment or trust in the 
European parliament would increase the explained variance. However, these variables are too 
correlated. For people who do not have a sophisticated opinion on the EU, the three questions are the 
same but formulated differently. Consequently, we choose not to use such variables and accept that a 
large part of the variance remain unexplained.  
 
                                                     
20
 This is mainly due to the inclusion of the income decile, this variable has a significant amount of missing 
variables. Including a proxy for income (the variable HINCFEL which is an income self positioning from "living 
comfortably on present income" to "very difficult on present income") with less missing values does not alter the 
results  
21
 The survey question typically used is: "do you see yourself as...(NATIONALITY) only / (NATIONALITY) and 
European / European and (NATIONALITY) /European only" 
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Table 3 
Variables Coef Std-error Coef Std-error Coef Std-error
female -0.151*** (0.0345) -0.0886** (0.0310) -0.102*** (0.0310)
reference category: 25-39
15-24 0.265** (0.0826) 0.305*** (0.0757) 0.337*** (0.0757)
40-54 -0.210*** (0.0451) -0.168*** (0.0443) -0.153*** (0.0444)
above 55 -0.128* (0.0520) -0.0302 (0.0513) -0.0558 (0.0512)
reference category: paid work
Education 0.444*** (0.103) 0.364*** (0.0856) 0.411*** (0.0858)
Unemployed -0.0303 (0.0685) -0.0541 (0.0657) -0.0467 (0.0655)
Retired 0.0985 (0.0526) 0.172*** (0.0516) 0.143** (0.0516)
Other 0.0370 (0.0574) 0.0425 (0.0540) 0.0414 (0.0539)
Member of a trade union -0.127*** (0.0366) -0.146*** (0.0358) -0.147*** (0.0357)
reference category: 5th decile
1st decile -0.134 (0.0740) -0.114 (0.0701) -0.133 (0.0701)
2nd decile -0.151* (0.0696) -0.127 (0.0667) -0.135* (0.0665)
3rd decile -0.0237 (0.0685) -0.00791 (0.0660) -0.0182 (0.0658)
4th decile 0.0175 (0.0681) 0.0179 (0.0657) 0.0172 (0.0655)
6th decile 0.122 (0.0689) 0.110 (0.0666) 0.0862 (0.0664)
7th decile 0.135* (0.0691) 0.167* (0.0668) 0.134* (0.0667)
8th decile 0.235*** (0.0711) 0.270*** (0.0687) 0.221** (0.0686)
9th decile 0.197** (0.0739) 0.229** (0.0714) 0.153* (0.0715)
10th decile 0.413*** (0.0751) 0.435*** (0.0720) 0.316*** (0.0726)
reference category: clerks             
Armed forces 0.237 (0.258)             
Managers 0.312*** (0.0803)             
Professionals 0.454*** (0.0664)             
Associate professionals 0.0419 (0.0675)             
Serv and sales -0.0878 (0.0653)             
Agri, forestry and fishery -0.367** (0.120)             
Trade workers -0.265*** (0.0724)             
Plant and machin operators -0.285*** (0.0765)             
Elementary occupations -0.206** (0.0726)             
ref cat: ES-ISCED III upper tier
ES-ISCED I -0.300*** (0.0653)
ES-ISCED II -0.274*** (0.0514)
ES-ISCED III lower tier -0.270*** (0.0539)
ES-ISCED IV -0.00849 (0.0543)
ES-ISCED V lower terciary 0.345*** (0.0599)
ES-ISCED V higher terciary 0.741*** (0.0567)
Years of education 0.0729*** (0.00457)
1.1.1 1.1.2 1.1.3
 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Constant 5.209 (0.173) 4.153 (0.175) 5.126 (0.161)
Variance components             
Country-level 0.436 (0.150) 0.435 (0.149) 0.402 (0.139)
Region-level 0.226 (0.0328) 0.223 (0.0319) 0.217 (0.0311)
Individual level 6.449 (0.0566) 6.409 (0.0544) 6.384 (0.0541)
N 26286 28059 28125              
 
Most variables are strongly significant and confirm that a wide divide among social groups exists when 
it comes to European integration. Model 1.1.1 tends to prove that social groups reluctant to further 
European integration are the same who traditionally fear liberalization, i.e. manual workers. Compared 
to the reference category (clerks), plants and machine operators support further integration less (by 
0.29), so do elementary occupations (0.20). Conversely, working as a manager raise support by 0.31 
and as a professional 0.45. Even though occupational clusters are taken into account, the highest 
income categories remain significantly more in favor of the European process (+0.4) than medium or 
low income ones. Trade union membership is significant and unionized workers are less supportive of 
further integration than their non-unionized counterparts (-0.13) points (in the 0-10 scale). As 
predicted, respondents in education are heavily supportive of the European Union. Being a student 
raises support by 0.44.  
Model 1.1.2 is similar to model 1.1.1, except that a continuous variable is included to account for the 
educational level of respondents instead of occupational categories. The impact is strongly significant 
and the impact of an additional year of education is 0.073. Since education ranges from 0 to 51, the 
predicted difference between the least educated and the most educated is 51*0.073=3.723 which is 
considerable. Model 1.1.3 proposes an alternative measure of education, using ES-ISCED classification. 
Compared to the reference category, lower education decreases support and higher education 
enhances it.   
Overall, we do not find any difference with respect to the existing literature. We confirm the results 
from Hobolt (2014) that supporters of deepening are traditional winners of the integration process.  
 
Random effects 
To model the different impact of individual variables on public support according to the characteristics 
of the region and the country respondents live in, we drop the assumption of fixed effects. The 
coefficient of the number of years of education completed is allowed to vary across levels.  
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 Table 4 
Variables Coef Std-error
female -0.0795* (0.0310)
reference category: 25-39
15-24 0.311*** (0.0757)
40-54 -0.169*** (0.0443)
above 55 -0.0315 (0.0513)
Years of education 0.0695*** (0.00866)
reference category: paid work
Education 0.357*** (0.0856)
Unemployed -0.0534 (0.0656)
Retired 0.166** (0.0517)
Other 0.0389 (0.0540)
Member of a trade union -0.143*** (0.0358)
reference category: 5th decile
1st decile -0.133 (0.0704)
2nd decile -0.128 (0.0667)
3rd decile -0.00797 (0.0660)
4th decile 0.0187 (0.0657)
6th decile 0.112 (0.0665)
7th decile 0.165* (0.0668)
8th decile 0.269*** (0.0686)
9th decile 0.228** (0.0714)
10th decile 0.434*** (0.0722)
Constant 4.185*** (0.204)
1.2
 
Variance components Coef Std-error
Country level
     Education 0.000830 (0.000456)
     Constant 0.598 (0.235)
     Constant, education -0.604 (0.312)
Region level
    Education 0.00151 (0.000587)
    Constant 0.603 (0.145)
    Constant, education -1,165 (0.201)
individual level 6.381 (0.0544)  
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In this model the variable “years of education” consists of two parts, a fixed and a random part. The 
fixed part is the expected value across all countries and regions (+0.069). The random part is a random 
coefficient following a normal distribution. We calculate its standard error to estimate a confidence 
interval which indicates how the coefficient varies from one country to another or from one region to 
another.  
At the country level, the variance of the variable education is estimated at 0.00083. Its standard 
deviation is 0.029. With normally distributed observations 95% of the observations lie between two 
standard deviations below and above the mean. Consequently, 95% of the regression coefficients are 
expected to lie between (0.069-0.057)=0.012 and (0.069+0.057)=0.126 
At the region level, the variance is estimated at 0.0015, so the standard deviation is 0.0387. 95% of the 
regression coefficients are expected to lie between (0.069-0.0774)=-0.0084 and (0.069+0.0774)=0.1464  
The predictive intervals express that 95% of the regression coefficients of the variable “years of 
education” are predicted to lie between 0.012 and 0.126 at the country level and -0.0084 and 0.1464 at 
the region level. We observe a large and significant variance of the regression coefficient of education 
across both countries and regions. 
 
Although they are not presented here, other variables were found to vary across levels, notably income 
and trade union membership.  
 
 
REGIONAL LEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
Due to data availability, a reduced sample including only 9 countries
22
 (around 17 000 observations) is 
used to document regional differences in EU support.  
 
Five fixed effect predictors are included in order to explain region-level variation: the percentage of 
tertiary education, the regional GDP, regional young unemployment and long term unemployment, as 
well as the percentage of net migration by region. A null model of the reduced sample (including 
16229 observations) estimates the variance component at the regional level at 0.12
23
. Thus the 
variance components are largely reduced with the inclusion of regional predictors (0.0448 in model 7). 
As predicted, the percentage of net migration, tertiary education and GDP all have a positive impact of 
EU support (model 2, 3, 6 and 7). Conversely, regional unemployment does not seem to affect support 
in the EU, neither young unemployment or long term unemployment are significant in model 4 and 5.   
 
                                                     
22
 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, The UK, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden 
23
 Tables are available upon request 
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Table 5 
Variables Coef Std-error Coef Std-error Coef Std-error
female -0.139** (-2.69) -0.131* (-2.31) -0.136** (-2.63)
reference category: 25-39
15-24 0.168 (1.42) 0.179 (1.36) 0.177 (1.49)
40-54 -0.205** (-3.03) -0.198** (-2.69) -0.202** (-2.98)
above 55 -0.161* (-2.10) -0.111 (-1.31) -0.155* (-2.01)
reference category: clerks
Armed forces 1.166** (2.98) 1.159** (2.81) 1.184** (3.03)
Managers 0.461*** (4.07) 0.472*** (3.89) 0.465*** (4.12)
Professionals 0.699*** (7.50) 0.779*** (7.77) 0.698*** (7.48)
Associate professionals 0.167 (1.77) 0.172 (1.71) 0.167 (1.78)
Serv and sales -0.0506 (-0.54) -0.136 (-1.33) -0.0454 (-0.48)
Agri, forestry and fishery -0.0651 (-0.35) -0.0101 (-0.05) -0.0499 (-0.27)
Trade workers -0.188 (-1.71) -0.148 (-1.24) -0.178 (-1.62)
Plant and machin operators -0.367** (-2.98) -0.299* (-2.23) -0.362** (-2.94)
Elementary occupations -0.186 (-1.68) -0.219 (-1.86) -0.178 (-1.61)
reference category: paid work
Education 0.628*** (4.54) 0.656*** (4.20) 0.628*** (4.54)
Unemployed -0.00833 (-0.07) -0.0872 (-0.72) -0.00158 (-0.01)
Retired 0.278*** (3.49) 0.263** (3.02) 0.279*** (3.51)
Other 0.00478 (0.06) 0.0452 (0.51) 0.00229 (0.03)
Member of a trade union -0.0812 (-1.49) -0.0245 (-0.42) -0.0711 (-1.31)
reference category: 5th decile
1st decile -0.118 (-1.02) -0.0724 (-0.58) -0.108 (-0.93)
2nd decile -0.103 (-0.98) -0.111 (-0.98) -0.0947 (-0.90)
3rd decile 0.0866 (0.81) 0.106 (0.91) 0.0963 (0.90)
4th decile -0.0192 (-0.18) 0.00898 (0.08) -0.0141 (-0.13)
6th decile 0.164 (1.58) 0.173 (1.55) 0.167 (1.62)
7th decile 0.198 (1.91) 0.229* (2.06) 0.199 (1.93)
8th decile 0.149 (1.42) 0.213 (1.86) 0.147 (1.40)
9th decile 0.306** (2.81) 0.402*** (3.33) 0.310** (2.86)
10th decile 0.506*** (4.63) 0.550*** (4.59) 0.503*** (4.62)
% of tertiary education by region 0.102** (3.04)
log of regional GPD (current price) 0.720*** (4.83)
Constant 5.042*** (18.10) 4.680*** (14.57) -2.420 (-1.54)
Variance components
Country-level 0.493 (-1.29) 0.488 (-1.21) 0.537 (-1.14)
Region-level 0.0672 (-8.65) 0.0542 (-7.19) 0.0385 (-7.72)
Individual level 6.369 (139.79) 6.580 (132.40) 6.370 (139.81)
N 11540 10006 11540
2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3
 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 6 
Variables Coef Std-error Coef Std-error Coef Std-error Coef Std-error
female -0.137* (-2.42) -0.131* (-2.32) -0.136** (-2.62) -0.125* (-2.20)
reference category: 25-39
15-24 0.160 (1.21) 0.173 (1.32) 0.169 (1.43) 0.183 (1.39)
40-54 -0.203** (-2.75) -0.202** (-2.74) -0.204** (-3.01) -0.196** (-2.66)
above 55 -0.123 (-1.45) -0.116 (-1.38) -0.166* (-2.16) -0.112 (-1.32)
reference category: clerks
Armed forces 1.256** (3.02) 1.158** (2.81) 1.156** (2.96) 1.172** (2.85)
Managers 0.460*** (3.78) 0.472*** (3.89) 0.454*** (4.01) 0.468*** (3.85)
Professionals 0.774*** (7.70) 0.783*** (7.81) 0.692*** (7.41) 0.774*** (7.70)
Associate professionals 0.164 (1.62) 0.173 (1.72) 0.162 (1.72) 0.167 (1.65)
Serv and sales -0.142 (-1.38) -0.136 (-1.34) -0.0480 (-0.51) -0.130 (-1.27)
Agri, forestry and fishery -0.0315 (-0.16) -0.0245 (-0.12) -0.0565 (-0.31) 0.00284 (0.01)
Trade workers -0.161 (-1.35) -0.153 (-1.29) -0.189 (-1.71) -0.146 (-1.23)
Plant and machin operators -0.290* (-2.16) -0.302* (-2.25) -0.362** (-2.94) -0.291* (-2.17)
Elementary occupations -0.233* (-1.97) -0.219 (-1.86) -0.186 (-1.68) -0.214 (-1.81)
reference category: paid work
Education 0.662*** (4.21) 0.657*** (4.21) 0.613*** (4.42) 0.643*** (4.10)
Unemployed -0.0980 (-0.81) -0.0819 (-0.68) -0.00728 (-0.06) -0.0821 (-0.68)
Retired 0.261** (2.98) 0.263** (3.02) 0.286*** (3.58) 0.272** (3.11)
Other 0.0547 (0.62) 0.0423 (0.48) 0.00249 (0.03) 0.0390 (0.44)
Member of a trade union -0.0269 (-0.46) -0.0226 (-0.39) -0.0839 (-1.54) -0.0213 (-0.36)
reference category: 5th decile
1st decile -0.0665 (-0.53) -0.0705 (-0.57) -0.105 (-0.90) -0.0565 (-0.45)
2nd decile -0.111 (-0.98) -0.110 (-0.97) -0.0966 (-0.91) -0.0955 (-0.84)
3rd decile 0.119 (1.02) 0.108 (0.93) 0.0831 (0.77) 0.108 (0.93)
4th decile 0.0110 (0.10) 0.00986 (0.09) -0.0239 (-0.23) 0.00635 (0.06)
6th decile 0.162 (1.44) 0.169 (1.51) 0.161 (1.55) 0.172 (1.53)
7th decile 0.224* (2.01) 0.222* (2.00) 0.186 (1.79) 0.213 (1.92)
8th decile 0.229* (1.99) 0.206 (1.80) 0.139 (1.32) 0.197 (1.71)
9th decile 0.394** (3.25) 0.391** (3.23) 0.311** (2.86) 0.403*** (3.33)
10th decile 0.560*** (4.65) 0.547*** (4.56) 0.501*** (4.59) 0.540*** (4.50)
% of tertiary education by region 0.0374 (0.93)
log of regional GPD (current price) 0.622** (3.06)
Regional young unemployment (%) -0.00283 (-0.34)             
Regional long term unemployment (%) -0.0220 (-0.85)             
% of net migration by region 0.252* (2.06) -0.0553 (-0.40)
Constant 5.117*** (15.32) 5.124*** (16.50) 4.966*** (17.44) -1.477 (-0.72)
Variance components             
Country-level 0.498 (-1.17) 0.504 (-1.15) 0.507 (-1.24) 0.515 (-1.12)
Region-level 0.0720 (-7.32) 0.0685 (-7.37) 0.0624 (-8.40) 0.0448 (-6.79)
Individual level 6.572 (131.83) 6.579 (132.38) 6.370 (139.52) 6.582 (132.12)
N 9936 10006 11493 9959
2.1.4 2.1.5 2.1.6 2.1.7
 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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COUNTRY LEVEL PREDICTORS 
 
As previously mentioned, variables at the region level were systematically available only for 9 
countries. Additionally, we choose not to include regional explanatory variables in the same regression 
because regional and national variables might blend (National GDP for example is a linear combination 
of regional GDP). Thus, in the next sections, region level predictors are not included and the larger 
sample (including 21 countries) is used. 
 
Fixed effects 
As a first step, national predictors are included as fixed effects. Indeed, a coefficient is calculated for 
the whole sample and the impact of variables are not allowed to vary from one country to another. We 
tested for the impact of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards, the percentage of tertiary 
education, the corruption index, young unemployment, Gini coefficients, the degree of wage 
coordination and union density. However, only three variables have a significant impact on EU support. 
They are presented in table 7. Higher scores stand for lower corruption in the Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index, thus, a negative sign is interpreted as high corruption 
increases support for further European integration. When the index increase by 1 point (corruption 
decreases) support for further integration drops by 0.268. Young unemployment is only significant at 
10% and as expected higher young unemployment decreases EU support. Since the percentage of 
young unemployment ranges from 7.6% to 46.4% the highest unemployment rate might decrease 
support by 1.38 point on the 0-10 EU support scale. Finally, the higher social expenditures, the more 
citizens support further integration which challenges our hypothesis.  
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Table 7 
Variables Coef Std-error
female -0.130*** (-3.53)
reference category: 25-39
15-24 0.221* (2.55)
40-54 -0.222*** (-4.65)
above 55 -0.153** (-2.77)
Member of a trade union -0.153*** (-3.92)
reference category: clerks
Armed forces 0.433 (1.54)
Managers 0.345*** (4.08)
Professionals 0.506*** (7.22)
Associate professionals 0.0623 (0.88)
Serv and sales -0.0718 (-1.04)
Agri, forestry and fishery -0.317* (-2.50)
Trade workers -0.251** (-3.26)
Plant and machin operators -0.299*** (-3.65)
Elementary occupations -0.197* (-2.52)
reference category: paid work
Education 0.469*** (4.48)
Unemployed 0.0130 (0.18)
Retired 0.120* (2.13)
Other -0.00919 (-0.15)
reference category: 5th decile
1st decile -0.140 (-1.74)
2nd decile -0.154* (-2.09)
3rd decile -0.0492 (-0.68)
4th decile 0.00660 (0.09)
6th decile 0.137 (1.90)
7th decile 0.147* (2.02)
8th decile 0.225** (3.00)
9th decile 0.222** (2.84)
10th decile 0.436*** (5.43)
Corruption -0.268** (-3.11)
Young unemployment -0.0356 (-1.85)
Social expenditures 0.0767* (2.32)
Constant 5.760*** (6.11)
3.1
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Variance components             
Country-level 0.188*** (-4.45)
Region-level 0.136*** (-11.29)
Individual level 6.365*** (196.54)
N 22795              
 
 
Cross-level interactions 
Model 3.2 in table 8 presents comprehensive models including 3 levels of analysis and interaction 
terms between individual and national predictors. Our aim is to document how national institutions 
affect the perception of the costs and benefits of European integration.  
In the presence of a significant interaction the effect of the interaction variable and the direct effects of 
the explanatory variables that make up that interaction must be interpreted together as a system. Thus 
both direct effects are included in the regression, even though they are not systematically significant. 
The regression slope of one of the direct variables is the expected value of the regression coefficient 
for the case that the other variable is equal to zero, and vice versa. If the observed values of one 
variable do not include zero, then the regression coefficient for the other variable has no substantive 
interpretation. We present average marginal effects for each interaction terms. 
 
The differentiated impact of education is investigated according to the degree of wage coordination in 
a country
24
 and the percentage of tertiary education. The results concerning wage setting coordination 
do not confirm the assumption of Scheve (2000). Once interacted with years of education, one can see 
that the more coordinated wage bargaining is the more education enhances support for further 
European integration (figure 3). Education is also interacted with the percentage of tertiary education. 
Following Brinegar and Jolly (2005), in countries with a high share of highly educated workers, the low 
skilled are expected to display a lower support for European integration than countries less endowed 
with skills.  A higher percentage of tertiary education should reinforce the positive impact of education 
on support. However the regression coefficient is negative and figure 5 shows that education has a 
positive and significant impact but this impact is mitigated by the percentage of tertiary education. In 
sum, a high percentage of tertiary education mitigates the positive impact of education on support in 
our sample.  
                                                     
24
 The degree of coordination is measured from 0 to 5, 5 being the highest level of coordination 
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 Table 8 
Variables Coef Std-error Coef Std-error
female -0.153*** (-4.19) -0.0865** (-2.79)
reference category: 25-39
15-24 0.201* (2.32) 0.309*** (4.08)
40-54 -0.228*** (-4.82) -0.173*** (-3.89)
above 55 -0.162** (-2.97) -0.0328 (-0.64)
Member of a trade union -0.0264 (-0.41) -0.145*** (-4.06)
reference category: clerks
Armed forces 0.320 (1.12)
Managers 0.310*** (3.71)
Professionals 0.472*** (6.83)
Associate professionals 0.0568 (0.81)
Serv and sales -0.0688 (-1.01)
Agri, forestry and fishery -0.290* (-2.31)
Trade workers -0.267*** (-3.51)
Plant and machin operators -0.314*** (-3.88)
Elementary occupations -0.202** (-2.64)
reference category: paid work
Education 0.468*** (4.42) 0.361*** (4.21)
Unemployed -0.0117 (-0.16) -0.0553 (-0.84)
Retired 0.130* (2.33) 0.170** (3.29)
Other 0.0195 (0.32) 0.0423 (0.78)
reference category: 5th decile
1st decile -0.186* (-2.33) -0.129 (-1.84)
2nd decile -0.174* (-2.41) -0.134* (-2.02)
3rd decile -0.0487 (-0.68) -0.0114 (-0.17)
4th decile -0.0188 (-0.26) 0.0159 (0.24)
6th decile 0.118 (1.65) 0.109 (1.64)
7th decile 0.131 (1.81) 0.165* (2.47)
8th decile 0.203** (2.71) 0.264*** (3.85)
9th decile 0.204** (2.63) 0.227** (3.17)
10th decile 0.415*** (5.27) 0.435*** (6.04)
Union density -0.00157 (-0.23)
UnionmembershipXUniondensity -0.00445* (-2.54)
Years of education 0.0421*** (4.65)
Coordination of wage setting -0.127 (-1.11)
EducationXCoordination 0.0110*** (3.95)
Constant 5.245*** (20.22) 4.513*** (13.40)
3.2.1 3.2.2
 
t statistics in parentheses  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Variance components
Country-level 0.326 (-3.16) 0.407 (-2.68)
Region-level 0.126 (-12.36) 0.222 (-10.52)
Individual level 6.443 (202.05) 6.401 (218.71)
N 23723 28059
3.2.1 3.2.2
 
 
Table 9 
Variables Coef Std-error Coef Std-error
female -0.0840** (-2.71) -0.0879** (-2.83)
reference category: 25-39
15-24 0.301*** (3.97) 0.308*** (4.07)
40-54 -0.171*** (-3.86) -0.169*** (-3.81)
above 55 -0.0319 (-0.62) -0.0312 (-0.61)
Member of a trade union -0.146*** (-4.09) -0.144*** (-4.03)
reference category: paid work
Education 0.357*** (4.17) 0.364*** (4.25)
Unemployed -0.0574 (-0.87) -0.0524 (-0.80)
Retired 0.164** (3.18) 0.172*** (3.33)
Other 0.0431 (0.80) 0.0427 (0.79)
reference category: 5th decile
1st decile -0.107 (-1.53) -0.124 (-1.76)
2nd decile -0.123 (-1.85) -0.130 (-1.95)
3rd decile -0.00647 (-0.10) -0.0108 (-0.16)
4th decile 0.0182 (0.28) 0.0174 (0.26)
6th decile 0.110 (1.65) 0.110 (1.65)
7th decile 0.168* (2.51) 0.165* (2.47)
8th decile 0.271*** (3.96) 0.267*** (3.89)
9th decile 0.234** (3.28) 0.227** (3.18)
10th decile 0.441*** (6.12) 0.434*** (6.03)
Years of education 0.155*** (6.94) 0.153*** (4.02)
Percentage of tertiary education 0.157 (0.81)
EducationXtertiaryeducation -0.0188*** (-3.75)
Gini coefficient 0.103* (2.34)
EducationXGinicoefficient -0.00275* (-2.12)
Constant 3.475*** (4.00) 1.176 (0.92)
3.2.3 3.2.4
 
t statistics in parentheses  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Variance components
Country-level 0.406 (-2.69) 0.354 (-3.04)
Region-level 0.220 (-10.56) 0.223 (-10.49)
Individual level 6.402 (218.72) 6.404 (218.76)
N 28059             28059             
3.2.4 3.2.5
 
 
As stated before, belonging to a trade union has a negative impact on support for further European 
unification. Now we see that this negative impact increases with union density
25
(figure 2). The fact that 
the coefficient for membership alone is not significant has no straightforward interpretation. The 
coefficient for union membership in regression 3.2.1 refers to a country where union density is zero 
which is an extreme value, not observed in the data.  However, one can infer that the negative impact 
of union membership is driven by countries where trade unions are strong and play a part in the 
debate over European integration.  
 
Finally, the impact of inequalities is considered. In the previous section we find no significant impact of 
the level of income inequalities (gini index
26
) on support for further unification. Now we consider the 
impact of inequalities according to the education level. Inequalities are expected to decrease support 
for further European integration for the low skilled (Kuhn et al, 2014). However, we find the opposite 
effect. The coefficient in model 3.2.4 indicates that higher inequalities mitigate the positive impact of 
education on public support for the EU. If education equals to zero, inequalities increase support 
(0.103). This should not be interpreted as positive impact of inequalities on EU feelings. Figure 6 in the 
appendix show that income inequalities do not have a significant impact on support for further 
unification except under 10 years of education. However figure 4 reveals that income inequalities 
reduces the positive impact of education on support for further unification. Empirical evidence prove 
that the educational divide is weaker in countries where inequalities are higher.   
 
 
 
                                                     
25
 To facilitate the interpretation, union density was standardized  
26
 The higher the Gini coefficient, the less egalitarian is the distribution of income 
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 Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
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 Overall, our results challenge previous results in the literature. The most straightforward explanation is 
the composition of the sample. Our sample is much larger than previous studies and includes central 
and eastern member states. The preferences of new member states are likely to be distinct because of 
their communist past and their emerging economies. The time period is also different from most of 
the literature we refer to. Data were collected in 2012 and the crisis might have affected public opinion 
temporarily or even permanently. Thirdly our dependant variable focuses on support for further 
European integration. Respondents who are opposed to it involve hard and soft eurosceptical and as 
such might blend different socioeconomic profiles. Finally there might be a technical reason for some 
counter-intuitive results. As one can see in the appendix, variables at the country-level do not vary 
strongly from one country to another. For example, the Gini coefficient or the percentage of tertiary 
education, are concentrated around the same values which might reflect a convergence within the EU. 
The former economic gaps are narrowing and fail to explain political attitudes towards the EU. 
 
 
ROBUSTESS CHECKS 
 
So far, our dependent variable was treated as linear. To make sure that our results are not sensitive to 
the choice of a linear specification, an ordered logit regression is estimated. The eleven original 
categories (from 0 to 10) were re-coded to five
27
. The estimated equation can be defined as: 
       (1) 
 
and are parameters to be estimated and is the latent variable, i.e. the intensity of the support 
for the European integration. D is a vector of individual socio-demographic characteristics (age and 
gender). E measures the socioeconomic position of individuals (ISCO classification, employment status 
and employment relation). C and R are a country and region dummies which accounts for any omitted 
country-specific and region-specific influences.  is the error term.  
 
We do not observe , but a variable  that goes from 1 to 5 and rises when public support for the 
European Union rises:  
if    
         
For  Where  are thresholds, with  and  
                                                     
27
 (0/1=1, 2/4=2, 5=3, 6/8=4 and 9/10=5) 
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 To facilitate the interpretation of the results, odd ratios are provided instead of coefficients. The odd 
ratio represents the odds that an event will occur given a particular exposure, compared to the odds of 
the outcome occurring in the absence of that exposure. Odd ratios allow to compare dummy variables 
in a meaningful way (within the same regression, the magnitude of coefficients is comparable). For 
example, an odd ratio of 0.5 for the dummy variable "female" means that, holding all other variables 
constant, the odds of having more negative attitudes toward European integration are half as large for 
women as for men. 
The results on individual predictors are unchanged. Tables are presented in the appendix.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Using a new dataset this chapter contributes to the debate on territorial versus transnational cleavage 
thanks to a multilevel structure and the inclusion of explanatory variables at three levels. Our focus on 
a new dependent variable (support for further integration) does not challenge what is usually found in 
the literature; highly skilled occupations and high incomes support further European integration a lot 
more than any other groups. Although its influence is modest, the regional dimension exists and 
influences public support for further European integration. We find three relevant predictors: the 
percentage of tertiary education, the regional GDP and the percentage of net migration. The role 
played by countries is well-documented in the literature and confirmed in the present study. Several 
macroeconomic variables are found to influence support within member states (corruption, young 
unemployment and social expenditures) and our results confirm that individual-level predictors work 
differently in different institutional contexts. Education has a positive and significant impact and this 
impact is increased by wage setting coordination but mitigated by income inequalities. Additionally in 
our sample, the higher the percentage of tertiary education, the smaller the education gap in public 
support for the EU. Our results challenge previous findings in the literature. The most likely explanation 
is that the opinion of citizens in the new member states is not shaped by the same drivers.  
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SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Larger sample 
Variable Frequency Percentage Total 
  
  
  
European unification go further or gone too far 
  
  
Unification already gone too far 2,424 6.50 37289 
1 1,659 4.45 37289 
2 2,701 7.24 37289 
3 3,63 9.73 37289 
4 3,415 9.16 37289 
5 8,325 22.33 37289 
6 3,73 10.00 37289 
7 3,959 10.62 37289 
8 3,582 9.61 37289 
9 1,362 3.65 37289 
Unification go further 2,502 6.71 37289 
Gender   
 
  
Male 18884 45.92 41121 
Female 22237 54.08 41121 
Age categories       
15-24 4717 11.47 41138 
25-39 8963 21.79 41138 
40-54 10568 25.69 41138 
55 and above 16890 41.06 41138 
Employment status       
Paid work 19319 47.50 40671 
Education 3398 8.35 40671 
Unemployed 3113 7.65 40671 
Retired 10072 24.76 40671 
Other 4769 11.73 40671 
Occupation       
Armed Forces occupations 145 0.39 36889 
Managers 2589 7.02 36889 
Professionals 5804 15.73 36889 
Technicians and Associate Professionals 5112 13.86 36889 
Clerical Support Workers 3263 8.85 36889 
Services and Sales Workers 6628 17.97 36889 
Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fish 993 2.69 36889 
Craft and Related Trades Workers 4474 12.13 36889 
Plants and Machine Operators and Assemb 3392 9.20 36889 
Elementary Occupations 4489 12.17 36889 
Member of a trade union       
No 22358 57.31 39012 
Yes 16654 42.69 39012 
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Education level (ES-ISCED)       
ES-ISCED I , less than lower secondary 5083 12.44 40850 
ES-ISCED II, lower secondary 7565 18.52 40850 
ES-ISCED IIIb, lower tier upper secondary 5819 14.24 40850 
ES-ISCED IIIa, upper tier upper secondary 9240 22.62 40850 
ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational 4814 11.78 40850 
ES-ISCED V1, lower tertiary education 3744 9.17 40850 
ES-ISCED V2, higher tertiary education 4585 11.22 40850 
Household's total net income, all sources       
1st decile 3715 11.37 32667 
2nd decile 3868 11.84 32667 
3rd decile 3607 11.04 32667 
4th decile 3516 10.76 32667 
5th decile 3339 10.22 32667 
6th decile 3242 9.92 32667 
7th decile 3158 9.67 32667 
8th decile 2928 8.96 32667 
9th decile 2626 8.04 32667 
10th decile 2668 8.17 32667 
Countries       
Belgium 1869 4.54 41138 
Bulgaria 2260 5.49 41138 
Cyprus 1116 2.71 41138 
Czech Republic 2009 4.88 41138 
Germany 2958 7.19 41138 
Denmark 1650 4.01 41138 
Estonia 2380 5.79 41138 
Spain 1889 4.59 41138 
Finland 2197 5.34 41138 
France 1968 4.78 41138 
United Kingdom 2286 5.56 41138 
Hungary 2014 4.90 41138 
Ireland 2628 6.39 41138 
Italy 960 2.33 41138 
Lithuania 2109 5.13 41138 
The Netherlands 1845 4.48 41138 
Poland 1898 4.61 41138 
Portugal 2151 5.23 41138 
Sweden 1847 4.49 41138 
Slovenia 1257 3.06 41138 
Slovakia 1847 4.49 41138 
        
Variable Mean SD Total 
Years of full-time education completed 12.5715 4.10578 40658 
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Reduced sample 
 
Variable Frequency Percentage Total 
  
  
  
European unification go further or gone too far 
  
  
Unification already gone too far 982 6.05 16229 
1 583 3.59 16229 
2 1144 7.05 16229 
3 1516 9.34 16229 
4 1444 8.90 16229 
5 3605 22.21 16229 
6 1628 10.03 16229 
7 1867 11.50 16229 
8 1813 11.17 16229 
9 620 3.82 16229 
Unification go further 1027 6.33 16229 
Gender       
Male 8183 47.77 17129 
Female 8946 52.23 17129 
Age categories       
15-24 2041 11.91 17142 
25-39 3561 20.77 17142 
40-54 4590 26.78 17142 
55 and above 6950 40.54 17142 
Employment status       
Paid work 8290 49.31 16813 
Education 1507 8.96 16813 
Unemployed 1134 6.74 16813 
Retired 3777 22.46 16813 
Other 2105 12.52 16813 
Occupation       
Armed Forces occupations 48 0.31 15499 
Managers 1208 7.79 15499 
Professionals 2799 18.06 15499 
Technicians and Associate Professionals 2563 16.54 15499 
Clerical Support Workers 1547 9.98 15499 
Services and Sales Workers 2844 18.35 15499 
Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fish 355 2.29 15499 
Craft and Related Trades Workers 1582 10.21 15499 
Plants and Machine Operators and Assemb 941 6.07 15499 
Elementary Occupations 1612 10.40 15499 
Member of a trade union       
No 8388 55.20 15196 
Yes 6808 44.80 15196 
 
 
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.31
Education level (ES-ISCED)       
ES-ISCED I , less than lower secondary 2439 14.28 17078 
ES-ISCED II, lower secondary 3151 18.45 17078 
ES-ISCED IIIb, lower tier upper secondary 3283 19.22 17078 
ES-ISCED IIIa, upper tier upper secondary 2188 12.81 17078 
ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational 2212 12.95 17078 
ES-ISCED V1, lower tertiary education 1752 10.26 17078 
ES-ISCED V2, higher tertiary education 2053 12.02 17078 
Household's total net income, all sources       
1st decile 1411 9.70 14550 
2nd decile 1769 12.16 14550 
3rd decile 1426 9.80 14550 
4th decile 1471 10.11 14550 
5th decile 1389 9.55 14550 
6th decile 1523 10.47 14550 
7th decile 1501 10.32 14550 
8th decile 1397 9.60 14550 
9th decile 1315 9.04 14550 
10th decile 1348 9.26 14550 
Countries       
Belgium 1858 10.84 17142 
Germany 2933 17.11 17142 
Denmark 1650 9.63 17142 
Spain 1888 11.01 17142 
France 1967 11.47 17142 
United Kingdom 2213 12.91 17142 
Italy 953 5.56 17142 
The Netherlands 1842 10.75 17142 
Sweden 1838 10.72 17142 
        
Variable Mean SD Total 
Years of full-time education completed 13,06745 4.308991 17020 
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Regions included in the regional analysis (9 countries) 
 
 
GERMANY BELGIUM FRANCE NETHERLANDS
Baden-Württemberg Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest Ile de France Groningen
Bayern Prov. Antwerpen Champagne-Ardenne Friesland (NL)
Berlin Prov. Limburg Picardie Drenthe
Brandenburg Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen Haute-Normandie Overijssel
Bremen Prov. Vlaams-Brabant Centre Gelderland
Hamburg Prov. West-Vlaanderen Basse-Normandie Flevoland
Hessen Prov. Brabant Wallon Bourgogne Utrecht
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Prov. Hainaut Nord-Pas-de-Calais Noord-Holland
Niedersachsen Prov. Liège Lorraine Zuid-Holland
Nordrhein-Westfalen Prov. Luxembourg Alsace Zeeland
Rheinland-Pfalz Prov. Namur Franche-Comté Noord-Brabant
Saarland Pays de la Loire Limburg (NL)
Sachsen SPAIN Bretagne
Sachsen-Anhalt Galicia Poitou-Charentes SWEDEN
Schleswig-Holstein Principado de Asturias Aquitaine Stockholms län
Thüringen Cantabria Midi-Pyrenées Uppsala län
País Vasco Limousin Södermanlands län
ITALY Comunidad Foral de Navarra Rhône-Alpes Östergötlands län
Piemonte La Rioja Auvergne Örebro län
Valle d'Aosta Aragón Languedoc-Roussillon Västmanlands län
Liguria Comunidad de Madrid Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur Jönköpings län
Lombardia Castilla y León Kronobergs län
Provincia autonoma di Bolzano Castilla-La Mancha ENGLAND Kalmar län
Provincia autonoma di Trento Extremadura South East Gotlands län
Veneto Cataluña South West Blekinge län
Friulia Venezia Giulia Comunidad Valencia North East (England) Skåne län
Emilia Romagna Illes Balears North West (England) Hallands län
Toscana Andalucía East Midlands (England) Västra Götalands län
Umbria Región de Murcia West Midlands (England) Värmlands län
Marche Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta East of England (England) Dalarnas län
Lazio Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla London (England) Gävleborgs län
Abruzzo Canarias Yorkshire & the Humber Västernorrlands län
Molise Wales Jämtlands län
Campania DENMARK Scotland Västerbottens län
Puglia Hovedstaden Northern Ireland Norrbottens län
Basilicata Sjælland
Calabria Syddanmark
Sicilia Midjylland
Sardegna Nordjylland  
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Explanatory variables at the region-level 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
            
GDP current price 2011 17142 31714,7 9633,1 15700 62000 
Population size 2011 17142 4019849 3849014 57269 1.78e+07 
Tertiary education (isced5_6) 2011 15304 158410,6 142678,2 2720 606628 
Long-term unemployment 2011 (%) 15304 3,7 2,7 .8 14.19 
Young unemployment 2011 (%) 15201 20,0 12,7 5.4 65.8 
Net migration 2010 17060 9665,5 15491,4 -48102 83923 
 
Using population size, tertiary education and net migration were transformed as percentages. To 
facilitate interpretation, the log of GDP is considered.  
 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
            
Tertiary education by region (%) 15304 3,72 1,19 0,56 8,50 
Net migration by region (%) 17060 0,31 0,35 -0,44 1,79 
Log of national GDP at current prices 17142 10,32 0,29 9,66 11.03489 
 
 
Explanatory variables at the country-level 
 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (2011) 
 
Country Index
Bulgaria 41
Italy 42
Slovakia 46
Czech Republic 49
Lithuania 54
Hungary 55
Poland 58
Slovenia 61
Portugal 63
Estonia 64
Spain 65
Cyprus 66
Ireland 69
France 71
Great Britain 74
Belgium 75
Germany 79
Netherlands 84
Sweden 88
Denmark 90
Finland 90  
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.31
The CPI is the most widely used indicator of corruption worldwide. Countries are rank on how corrupt 
their public sectors are seen to be. It is a combination of surveys and assessments of corruption, 
collected by a variety of reputable institutions. A country score indicates the perceived level of public 
sector corruption on a scale of 0-100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 
a 100 means that a country is perceived as very clean. A country's rank indicates its position relative to 
the other countries/territories included in the index. 
Source: European Social Survey 
 
Social expenditure in percentage of GDP 2011, Union density, Gini coefficient of equivalised 
disposable income 2011, Unemployment rates by age 15-24 years in % 2011, volume index of 
GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) and percentage of tertiary education 
 
Country Social exp UD Gini Young U GDP PPS tertiary educ (%)
Belgium 29,7 55.1 26,3 18,7 120 4,20
Czech Republic 20,8 15.8 25,2 18 83 4,25
Denmark 30,6 66.4 27,8 14,2 126 4,66
Estonia 18,2 6.9 31,9 22,3 68 5,20
Finland 29,2 69.6 25,8 20,1 117 5,74
France 32,0 7.7 30,8 23 108 3,48
Germany 25,9 18 29 8,6 122 3,13
Ireland 23,3 34.4 29,8 29,1 130 4,30
Italy 27,5 36.3 31,9 29,1 103 3,31
Netherlands 23,4 19.1 25,8 7,6 135 4,06
Poland 20,5 13.6 31,1 25,8 64 5,40
Portugal 25,0 18.3 34,2 30,1 78 3,75
Slovakia 18,1 14.1 25,7 33,2 73 4,20
Slovenia 23,7 23.1 23,8 15,7 83 5,23
Spain 26,4 16.9 34,5 46,4 95 4,18
Sweden 27,6 67.8 24,4 22,8 127 4,92
United Kingdom 23,6 26.5 33 21,1 106 3,95
Cyprus . 49 29,2 22,4 96 3,82
Hungary 21,9 . 26,8 26,1 65 3,82
Bulgaria . . 35 25 44 3,87
Lithuania . 9.6 33 32,2 65 6,13  
 
Gross domestic product (GDP) is defined as the value of all goods and services produced less the value 
of any goods or services used in their creation. The volume index of GDP per capita in Purchasing 
Power Standards (PPS) is expressed in relation to the European Union (EU28) average set to equal 100. 
If the index of a country is higher than 100, this country's level of GDP per head is higher than the EU 
average and vice versa. PPS eliminates the differences in price levels between countries allowing 
meaningful volume comparisons of GDP between countries.  
Source: EUROSTAT 
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Union Density rate is defined as net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in 
employment 
Source: Visser 
 
The Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income 2011 is defined as the relationship of cumulative 
shares of the population arranged according to the level of equivalised disposable income, to the 
cumulative share of the equivalised total disposable income received by them. 
Source: European Social Survey (Original source: SILC) 
 
Social expenditures, the rate of young unemployment and the percentage of tertiary education are 
extracted from the multilevel database of the European Social Survey (Original source: Eurostat). 
Tertiary education correspond to the category ISCED 5_6. It is considered as a proxy for human capital 
endowments.  
 
Coordination of wage-setting 
Based on Kenworthy (2001a; 2001b). Note that this is an indicator of the “degree, rather than the type, 
of coordination”  
Source: Visser 
 
1 Estonia Great Bri Hungary Ireland Lithuania Poland
2 Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep Portugal Slovakia France
3 Spain Italy Slovenia Sweden
4 Germany Denmark The Nethe
5 Belgium Finland  
 
5 = maximum or minimum wage rates/increases based on 
a) Centralized bargaining by peak association(s), with or without government involvement, and/or 
government imposition of wage schedule/freeze, with peace obligation 
b) Informal centralisation of industry-level bargaining by a powerful and monopolistic union 
confederation 
c) Extensive, regularized pattern setting and highly synchronized bargaining coupled with coordination 
of bargaining by influential large firms 
4 = wage norms or guidelines (recommendations) based on 
a) Centralized bargaining by peak associations with or without government involvement 
b) Informal centralisation of industry-level bargaining by a powerful and monopolistic union 
confederation 
c) Extensive, regularized pattern setting coupled with high degree of union concentration 
3 = negotiation guidelines based on 
a) Centralized bargaining by peak associations with or without government involvement 
b) Informal centralisation of industry-level bargaining 
c) Government arbitration or intervention 
2 = mixed industry and firm-level bargaining, with no or little pattern bargaining and relatively weak 
elements of government coordination through the setting of minimum wage or wage indexation 
1 = fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms or plants 
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ORDERED LOGIT REGRESSION 
Variables Coef Std-error Coef Std-error Coef Std-error
female 0.893*** (-4.62) 0.932** (-3.19) 0.922*** (-3.68)
reference category: 25-39
15-24 1.205** (3.22) 1.238*** (4.00) 1.263*** (4.37)
40-54 0.857*** (-4.84) 0.883*** (-3.97) 0.891*** (-3.67)
above 55 0.898** (-2.92) 0.960 (-1.12) 0.942 (-1.62)
reference category: paid work
Education 1.337*** (4.05) 1.282*** (4.12) 1.324*** (4.64)
Unemployed 0.972 (-0.58) 0.956 (-0.96) 0.961 (-0.85)
Retired 1.077* (1.96) 1.131*** (3.33) 1.108** (2.77)
Other 1.009 (0.22) 1.012 (0.32) 1.013 (0.34)
Member of a trade union 0.928** (-2.86) 0.912*** (-3.59) 0.914*** (-3.52)
reference category: 5th decile 0.910 (-1.77) 0.916 (-1.73) 0.905* (-1.97)
1st decile 0.895* (-2.22) 0.905* (-2.09) 0.900* (-2.19)
2nd decile 0.987 (-0.27) 0.994 (-0.12) 0.989 (-0.24)
3rd decile 1.016 (0.32) 1.017 (0.37) 1.016 (0.34)
4th decile
6th decile 1.092 (1.80) 1.086 (1.75) 1.068 (1.40)
7th decile 1.096 (1.88) 1.117* (2.34) 1.096 (1.94)
8th decile 1.166** (3.07) 1.190*** (3.59) 1.153** (2.94)
9th decile 1.148** (2.64) 1.175** (3.19) 1.120* (2.23)
10th decile 1.343*** (5.52) 1.367*** (6.09) 1.261*** (4.47)
reference category: clerks             
Armed forces 1.159 (0.77)             
Managers 1.236*** (3.69)             
Professionals 1.345*** (6.34)             
Associate professionals 1.011 (0.23)             
Serv and sales 0.927 (-1.65)             
Agri, forestry and fishery 0.739*** (-3.48)             
Trade workers 0.824*** (-3.76)             
Plant and machin operators 0.815*** (-3.76)             
Elementary occupations 0.860** (-2.93)             
ref cat: ES-ISCED III upper tier
ES-ISCED I 0.830*** (-3.98)
ES-ISCED II 0.838*** (-4.80)
ES-ISCED III lower tier 0.836*** (-4.64)
ES-ISCED IV 0.990 (-0.26)
ES-ISCED V lower terciary 1.276*** (5.74)
ES-ISCED V higher terciary 1.656*** (12.37)
Years of education 1.050*** (14.89)             
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 26286 28059 28125             
1.1.1 1.1.2 1.1.3
 
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses    * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
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